

Supplementary Material

Family Matters: Education and the (Conditional) Effect of State Indoctrination in China

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These appendices contain materials, results and robustness checks that supplement the main text. The regression tables report the regression coefficients using the baseline model, while the coefficient plots report the marginal effects of the new politics textbooks calculated by the baseline results.

- **Supplementary Sections**

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Online Appendix A

Public Employment, Proregime Bias, and Parental Transmission. Panel (A) shows that public employees have stronger proregime attitudes than nongovernment employees. All regressions include personal characteristics as controls and are based on 10 multiple-imputed datasets. Panel (B) focuses on the respondents in this study, showing that affiliated subjects are more likely to apply for a CCP membership than nonaffiliated subjects

Table SI-1

Panel A: Public Employment and Political Attachment

VARIABLES	(1) Trust	(2) Satisfaction	(3) Pride
Public Employee	0.307* (0.178)	0.349** (0.143)	0.092* (0.048)
Local Hukou	0.499*** (0.106)	0.287*** (0.088)	-0.012 (0.027)
Ethnicity: Han	-0.297** (0.150)	-0.098 (0.117)	0.165*** (0.040)
Gender: Male	-0.285*** (0.088)	0.166** (0.073)	0.052** (0.023)
Age	0.022*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
Constant	7.256*** (0.211)	6.943*** (0.170)	3.143*** (0.052)
Observations	3,989	3,989	3,989

Panel B: Odds Ratio of Applying for Party Membership

VARIABLES	Party Membership Application
Affiliated Students =1	1.580** (0.281)
Residence (Rural)	0.728** (0.096)
Ethnicity (Han)	1.231 (0.277)
Gender (Male)	0.775** (0.079)
Birth Year	0.948*** (0.017)
CCP Father	1.387** (0.203)
CCP Mother	0.901 (0.140)
Observations	2,054

Robust seeform in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Online Appendix B

Government Documents. This section discusses five government documents related to the Eighth Curriculum Reform. I outline each of them below in chronic order.

- "*Decision on Deepening Education Reform, and Promoting Comprehensively the Quality Education*" was issued by China's State Council on June 3, 1999.¹ It marks the beginning of the planning phase of the curriculum reform and, in particular, calls for a reform of the curriculum content.
- "*Decision on Basic Education Reform and Development*" was released by the State Council on May 29, 2001.² It reemphasizes that basic education plays a strategic role in facilitating socialist modernization. In Section 3, the document briefly introduces government objectives for the curriculum reform, such as teaching students (socialist) democracy, the rule of law, and collectivism.
- "*Outlines of Basic Education Reform*" was issued by China's Ministry Education on June 8, 2001.³ This is the first main document in which the government outlines the general objectives for the high school curriculum reform. It also notes that the government would establish a corresponding curriculum framework to support the implementation of the reform.
- "*Suggestions on Strengthening the Ideological and Moral Construction of the Youth*" was issued by the State Council on February 26, 2004.⁴ It describes the political objectives that should be achieved through the high school politics curriculum.
- "*Curriculum Framework for the High School Politics Subject*," was issued by the Ministry of Education on March 2, 2011.⁵ It presents the specific goals of the new politics curriculum. Notably, it serves as the guiding framework for textbook authors, high school teachers, exam preparation book publishers, and high school students (Cantoni et al., 2017).

¹See http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_sjzl/moe_177/tnull_2478.html (Retrieved: 05/01/20).

²See http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_60920.htm (Retrieved: 05/01/20).

³See http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A26/jcj_kcjcgh/200106/t20010608_167343.html (Retrieved: 05/01/20).

⁴See http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62719.htm (Retrieved: 05/01/20).

⁵See http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A26/s8001/200403/t20040302_167352.html (Retrieved: 05/01/20).

Added Sections (Items) in the New Textbooks (College Entrance Exam). Using data from a text analysis conducted by Cantoni et al. (2017), I list the added sections (items) in the new textbooks (college entrance exam) with respect to the categories of interest below.

- CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

- Added Sections in the New Textbooks

- * Main components of political life
- * How to participate in political life
- * The choice of election methods and its basis
- * Various ways of participating in democratic decision-making
- * Citizens' direct participation in democratic decision-making
- * The most comprehensive democratic practices in China
- * Orderly and disorderly political participation

- Added Items in the Exam Framework

- * Chinese citizens' rights of democratic supervision
- * Basic principles and content of Chinese citizens participating in political life
- * Channels for Chinese citizens to participate in political life
- * China's election system and method
- * Various ways for citizens to participate in democratic decision-making
- * The significance of citizens directly participating in democratic decision-making
- * The meaning and significance of Chinese villages and urban dwellers governing themselves

- CHINESE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

- Added Sections in the New Textbooks

- * Limitations of market allocation of resources
- * Basic characteristics of the socialist market economy
- * Strengthening the state's macroeconomic regulations and controls
- * Functions of fiscal policies
- * How to correctly utilize fiscal policies
- * The concept of public goods

- Added Items in the Exam Framework

- * Market adjustment and its limitations

- * Market allocation of resources
- * Basic characteristics of the socialist market economy
- * Public finance and infrastructure construction
- * Public finance and macroeconomic regulations and controls
- * Public finance and the guarantee of people's living standards

- GOVERNANCE

- Added Sections in the New Textbooks

- * Various methods of democratic supervision
- * Responsible exercise of the supervision right
- * A government that benefits its people
- * Ways to seek help; legal channels to voice complaints
- * The specific requirements for government to adhere to the rule of law
- * The significance of restricting and supervising government's power
- * Cheers for the 'Sunshine Project' (local government operational transparency project)
- * Where does the government's authority come from?

- Added Items in the Exam Framework

- * Chinese citizens' rights of democratic supervision
- * The legal channels to conduct democratic supervision
- * Citizens need to exercise the right of democratic supervision in a responsible manner
- * The duties of the Chinese government
- * The fundamental guidelines of the Chinese government; the basic principles of government operations
- * The significance and requirement of the rule of law
- * To improve the government's ability to adhere to the rule of law
- * The significance of restricting and supervising government's power
- * China's administrative supervision system
- * The origin and establishment of the Chinese government's authority

Translated Excerpts from the New Textbooks. This section provides translated excerpts from the new textbooks to show how the textbook content related to the outcome of

interest was presented under the new politics curriculum. The textbook excerpts are complementary to evidence of changes in the frequency of words across curricula, which does not reveal the context surrounding the relevant words, discussed in the main text.

- CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

- The development of socialist democracy is an important goal for socialist modernization. To achieve this objective, we must be under the leadership of the Party and popular sovereignty, governing the country by law (excerpted from "Main components of political life").
- An essential guarantee for all decisions to meet the fundamental interests of the public is to elect people who represent the will of the people in democratic elections to join the decision-making institutions and participate in the review, supervision, and formulation of policies. (excerpted from "Various ways of participating in democratic decision-making").
- Citizen participation in the decision-making process through various channels and approaches is crucial to putting decision-making on a more scientific and democratic basis (excerpted from "Citizens' direct participation in democratic decision-making").
- Developing grassroots democracy and ensuring that people enjoy democratic rights are fundamental to the country's development of socialist democracy. ...According to the Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees of the People's Republic of China, voting for the members of the Villagers' Committee directly is an important basis of villagers' self-governance. ...According to the Organic Law of the Urban Residents' Committee of the People's Republic of China, the members of the Urban Residents' Committee are democratically elected by residents (excerpted from "The most comprehensive democratic practices in China").
- Citizens' orderly and disorderly political participation differs in whether they engage in democracy in line with the Constitution, laws, regulations, and procedures; whether they exercise political rights and fulfill political obligations in accordance with the law. ...Following the Constitution, laws, regulations, and procedures ensures orderly participation; otherwise disorder, and even chaos, can be the result (excerpted from "Orderly and disorderly political participation").

- CHINESE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

- Market allocations are far from omnipotent. ...The reliance on market allocations entirely would cause reduced efficiency of resource distributions, giving rise to the

waste of resources; the society and economy become unstable, and economic fluctuations as well as chaos occur. There will be unfair income distribution, widening income inequality, and severe polarization (excerpted from "Limitations of market allocation of resources").

- The capitalist market economy is based on private ownership. Upholding the dominant position of public ownership is the foundation of socialist market economy. ...Socialist market economy enables the country to stretch its advantage of aggregating human, physical, and financial resources, making the country's macro-adjustment and intervention better and more effective (excerpted from "Basic characteristics of the socialist market economy").
- Macroeconomic regulations and controls are the government's main responsibilities and functions. ...The country adopts various methods to macro-adjust the national economy. ...The country applies economic, legal, and administrative means to implement the objectives of macroeconomic control (excerpted from "Strengthening the state's macroeconomic regulation and control").

- GOVERNANCE

- When people exercise their power of supervision, they must have the courage to fight against evil and use the supervisory power stipulated in the Constitution and laws for the benefit of the country and the people. Additionally, they must adopt legal approaches and do not interfere with government activities (excerpted from "Responsible exercise of the supervision right").
- The government should exercise its power in accordance with the law and be subject to people's supervision. The country is striving to build a government with legal authority and responsibilities, strict and impartial law enforcement, openness and justice, integrity and efficiency, and law-abidance and honesty based on the rule of law (excerpted from "A government that benefits its people").
- The government provides various channels for citizens to seek assistance or file complaints, such as setting up hotlines, building up a petition system, and establishing an administrative adjudication system. Citizens should learn to turn to or file complaints to government departments in accordance with the law, which can help solve their own difficulties, safeguard their rights and interests, and keep improving the government in terms of administrative efficiency (excerpted from "Ways to seek help; legal channels to voice complaints").
- The country operates according to law and endeavors to build a socialist country with the rule of law. The authority of the government is granted by law, and

the exercise of administrative powers must be based on the Constitution and laws. This is the so-called administration by law, which is a basic requirement for policy implementations of the government and the principle of being responsible to its people (excerpted from "The specific requirements for government to adhere to the rule of law").

- The country has established a comprehensive administrative supervision system on the basis of the Constitution and laws. ...The government under supervision is a guarantee for adhering to the rule of law and administrative efficiency (excerpted from "The significance of restricting and supervising government's power").
- To better serve the people, the government has been promoting transparency in government activities and public affairs. ...Such transparency helps regulate the behavior of the government and its officials and enhance the government's credibility (excerpted from "Cheers for the 'Sunshine Project'").
- In the socialist country led by the CCP, the government, which comes from and serves the people, wins the support of the majority of the people; it represents an incomparable authority that no governments in history could achieve. The authority of a government is marked when its management and services are recognized and accepted by the people (excerpted from "Where does the government's authority come from?").

Online Appendix C

Question Wording. The original Chinese along with the English translations of the survey questions and response options used for the outcome variables in this paper are as follows.

Intervention

#1. When an individual criticizes the government in public, the government should not intervene. Do you agree? (如果有人是在公共场所发布批评政府的言论，政府不应该干涉。您同意吗)

1. Completely disagree (完全不同意)
2. Somewhat disagree (比较不同意)
3. Neither agree nor disagree (无所谓同意不同意)
4. Somewhat agree (比较同意)
5. Completely agree (完全同意)

#2. How many children people want to have is a personal matter; the government should not intervene. Do you agree? (生多少孩子是个人的事，政府不应该干涉。您同意吗)

1. Completely disagree (完全不同意)
2. Somewhat disagree (比较不同意)
3. Neither agree nor disagree (无所谓同意不同意)
4. Somewhat agree (比较同意)
5. Completely agree (完全同意)

#3. People have the freedom to decide where to work and live; the government should not intervene. Do you agree? (在哪里工作和生活是个人的自由，政府不应该干涉。您同意吗)

1. Completely disagree (完全不同意)
2. Somewhat disagree (比较不同意)
3. Neither agree nor disagree (无所谓同意不同意)
4. Somewhat agree (比较同意)
5. Completely agree (完全同意)

Democracy

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement, or you do not know? *A political system can be considered a democracy as long as citizens have the right to elect their representatives, who discuss critical national and local issues on behalf of citizens.* (下列是一些说法，您是同意？不同意？还是不知道？“如果老百姓有权选举自己的代表去讨论国家和地方的大事，也算是民主”)

1. Agree (同意)
2. Disagree (不同意)
3. Do not know (不知道)

Trust

To what extent do you trust these people: local officials? (您对下面这些人的信任程度如何：地方政府官员？)

1. A great deal (非常信任)
2. Somewhat trust (比较信任)
3. Somewhat distrust (不太信任)
4. Not at all (完全不信任)


Sources of Data. Readers may have noticed that the sample size varies for models using the *Intervention*, *Democracy*, and *Trust* outcomes. This is caused by the fact that the Chinese General Social Survey may change questions across survey waves. Specifically, the *Intervention* questions were asked in all four waves. The *Democracy* question was asked only in the 2013 wave. The *Trust* question has fewer observations because only a subset of respondents in the 2012 wave was asked the question. Table SI-2 indicates which questions were asked in each wave with a check mark and the associated number of observations.

Table SI-2: Sources of Observations from Survey Waves

	Intervention	Democracy	Trust
2010 Round	✓($N=392$)	✗	✗
2012 Round	✓($N=521$)	✗	✓($N=275$)
2013 Round	✓($N=584$)	✓($N=536$)	✗
2015 Round	✓($N=578$)	✗	✗
Total N	2075	536	275


The complete absence of data on particular variables in some survey waves means that I cannot multiply impute for the missingness. However, I conduct two analyses regarding *Intervention* to evaluate the robustness of my results. First, I reestimate the effects on *Intervention* when restricting each model to the number of observations available across indicators in that wave. For example, when analyzing the 2012 wave, I restrict the sample to the 275 respondents who responded to *Trust*. For the 2013 wave, I focus on only the 536 respondents who are available for the analysis in which *Democracy* is the outcome. In the waves where neither *Trust* nor *Democracy* was recorded, I simply use the respondents from the survey wave. Figure SI-1 reports the separate regression coefficients with corresponding confidence intervals at the .05 and .1 level. Results show that the estimated marginal effects within each wave are similar to the baseline results, except for the 2012 wave. As expected, the standard errors become larger as a result of fewer observations. I thus prefer a larger sample for the analysis of *Intervention* (i.e., N=2075) in order to have more precise estimates

Figure SI-1: Estimated Marginal Effects on *Intervention* by Survey Waves



Second, I reestimate the coefficient, including survey fixed effects to account for time-varying factors that could affect respondents differently across survey waves. Results reported in Figure SI-2 are nearly identical to the baseline estimates.

Figure SI-2: Estimated Marginal Effects on *Intervention* Controlling for Survey Fixed Effects




Additional Analyses of Intervention. In the main analysis, *Intervention* is an additive scale based on three survey items related to people’s attitudes toward state intervention in citizen life. Here, I first report the interitem correlations.

	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3
Item 1 (Criticism of Government)			
Item 2 (Number of Children)	0.292		
Item 3 (Place to Work and Live)	0.218	0.190	


Next, I report the baseline results on each item separately. For comparison and consistency, I standardize each item to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. For reference, the leftmost panel in Figure SI-3 reports the estimates using the additive scale. Results from the rest of panels show that the estimates for the individual items all have the right direction and follow a consistent pattern—the coefficients are larger among the affiliated sample than the nonaffiliated sample. The three estimates also have similar sizes. None are not statistically significant, however, using a 0.05 two-tailed criterion. One possible explanation is that the variation of the items is all smaller than that of the additive scale.

Figure SI-3: Marginal Effects of the New Textbooks on Intervention Items



I also reestimate the baseline model by using principal component analysis. I first estimate the principal components with the three items and find that only the first estimated component, which explains 49% of the total variance of the items, has an eigenvalue greater than one. I then use the first component as the outcome variable to reestimate the treatment effect. Figure SI-4 shows that the new estimates are almost identical to the baseline estimates using the additive scale.

Figure SI-4: Marginal Effects of the New Textbooks on Intervention using PCA



Online Appendix D

Balance Test. Table [SI-3](#) reports the results of difference-in-means. Accounting for province and cohort fixed effects, the OLS estimates show that the treatment and control groups are indistinguishable in several personal characteristics.

Main Results. Table [SI-4](#) shows the OLS estimates of the effects of the new textbooks on attitudes.

Marginal Effects by Affiliation Status. Table [SI-5](#) reports the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks, calculated based on the results from the baseline model, on each of the two groups (affiliated and nonaffiliated samples).

Falsification Tests. Table [SI-6](#) reports the OLS estimates using placebo attitudes (Panel A) and placebo reform years (Placebo B)

Table SI-3: Balance Test

VARIABLES	Exposure to the New Curriculum
Gender: Male	0.006 (0.009)
Ethnicity: Han	0.007 (0.007)
Height	-0.002 (0.009)
Rural Residence	-0.003 (0.006)
Father is CCP Member	0.001 (0.008)
Mother is CCP Member	0.008 (0.008)
Father's Educational Level	0.004 (0.007)
Mother's Educational Level	0.009 (0.007)
Affiliated Father	0.003 (0.006)
Affiliated Mother	-0.006 (0.006)
Constant	0.018 (0.039)
Province FE	✓
Cohort FE	✓
Observations	2,026
R-squared	0.756

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table SI-4: Main Results. All regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province \times cohort level.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Government Intervention	Socialist Democracy	Trust in Officials	Government Intervention	Socialist Democracy	Trust in Officials
New Curriculum	0.099 (0.083)	-0.178 (0.155)	0.042 (0.220)	0.075 (0.085)	-0.248 (0.161)	-0.084 (0.230)
Affiliated Students				-0.310*** (0.118)	-0.318* (0.188)	-0.192 (0.257)
New Curriculum \times Affiliated Students				0.300* (0.172)	0.830*** (0.207)	0.755** (0.294)
Constant	0.106 (0.068)	-0.066*** (0.014)	0.361 (0.383)	0.124* (0.074)	0.074 (0.069)	0.420 (0.384)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,075	536	275	2,075	536	275
R-squared	0.043	0.056	0.177	0.047	0.069	0.196

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table SI-5: Marginal Treatment Effects by Affiliation Status

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Marginal Effects Comparison	Government Intervention	Socialist Democracy	Trust in Officials
Affiliated Students	0.375** (0.179)	0.582*** (0.215)	0.671* (0.356)
Nonaffiliated Students	0.075 (0.085)	-0.248 (0.161)	-0.084 (0.230)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,075	536	275

Clustered Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table SI-6: Falsification Tests: The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province \times cohort level.

Panel A: Placebo Attitudes

VARIABLES	(1) Trust in People	(2) Trust in Relatives	(3) Trust in Neighbors	(4) Trust in Bank Staff	(5) Trust in Journalists
New Curriculum	0.230 (0.190)	0.117 (0.132)	0.039 (0.136)	0.004 (0.141)	0.007 (0.179)
Affiliated Student	-0.048 (0.174)	0.326** (0.125)	0.128 (0.154)	0.312** (0.121)	-0.135 (0.144)
New Curriculum \times Affiliated Student	0.209 (0.275)	-0.242 (0.167)	-0.238 (0.207)	-0.313 (0.214)	0.232 (0.255)
Constant	3.363*** (0.129)	3.384*** (0.319)	2.655*** (0.111)	2.889*** (0.114)	2.273*** (0.185)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	521	280	280	280	276
R-squared	0.095	0.189	0.142	0.181	0.125

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Panel B: Placebo Reform

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democracy	(3) Trust
New Curriculum	0.008 (0.078)	0.067 (0.164)	0.015 (0.269)
Affiliated Student	-0.122 (0.091)	-0.202 (0.181)	-0.007 (0.217)
New Curriculum \times Affiliated Student	0.082 (0.131)	0.281 (0.248)	-0.035 (0.378)
Constant	0.046 (0.065)	0.326*** (0.123)	0.796*** (0.255)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,796	440	232
R-squared	0.046	0.129	0.189

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Online Appendix E

I conduct a series of additional tests to evaluate the robustness of my results. I discuss each of them below.

- First, one may be concerned about the assumption of my analysis that students start high school at age 15 because some people might start high school earlier or later. I use two strategies to address this crossover concern. Had my results been sensitive to the school entry year assumption, I should not have found any effect in these two analyses.
 - I explore three different bandwidths around the threshold: (1) the cohorts just one year above and below the reform year, (2) a two-cohort bandwidth on each side of the curriculum, and (3) a three-cohort bandwidth on each side of the curriculum. Table SI-7 and Figure SI-5 show that my results are robust to various bandwidth selections.
 - I reanalyze the data taking people’s birth months into account. In the main analysis I assume people are 15 when they start high school, but sometimes people need to have hit the required age by August 31 to start school; one would wait a whole extra year if her birthday is after that. For example, some aged 16 born September-December had to wait a year and so they actually went through the new textbooks, but in the analysis I code them as pre-reform. I recode some respondents’ treatment conditions in light to their birth years and months, finding that my results are mostly the same (the only exception is *Intervention*; see Table SI-8 and Figure SI-6).
- Second, even if students cannot self-select parents who work for the government, one may still wonder whether some other feature of these students other than parental occupation explains their differential responses to the treatment. I address this concern by matching parents’ background characteristics that would affect their public employment status, including CCP membership and educational attainment.⁶ When implementing the entropy balancing method (Hainmueller, 2012), Table SI-9 and Figure SI-7 show that my results from a reweighted sample are still robust.
- Third, one may wonder whether the inclusion of individual-level controls would overturn the results. I reanalyze the data by adding several individual controls. To avoid post-treatment bias, I first include factors occurring before students start high school (i.e.,

⁶Granted, many other factors could affect public employment status, but the parental information in the survey I can use is rather limited.

before exposure to politics textbooks), such as gender, ethnicity, household registration, parents' Party membership, and parents' educational attainment. In an alternative specification, I add a series of posttreatment variables potentially correlated with people's political attitudes, such as a person's educational attainment, frequency of media use, CCP membership, and perceived socioeconomic condition. Table SI-10 and Figure SI-8 show that the results are stable.

- Fourth, because the introduction dates of the new curriculum were not randomly assigned across provinces, a concern is that factors determining the introduction dates instead of the new curriculum may affect individuals' attitudes. I reanalyze the data by taking into account province-level income in 2003, a powerful predictor of earlier adoption of the new curriculum (Cantoni et al., 2017). Specifically, I control for the interaction between a province's 2003 gross regional product per capita and the cohort fixed effects. Table SI-11 and Figure SI-9 show that including these controls does not considerably affect my findings.
- Fifth, I reanalyze the data by including a full set of province fixed effects interacted with cohort-level trends. This model specification allows each province to have its own linear trend in attitudes across cohorts, addressing the concern that trends in the attitudes across the cohort in provinces may generate the differences in attitudes that I attribute to the new politics textbooks. Table SI-12 and Figure SI-10 show that controlling for province-specific, cross-cohort trends does not substantially change the results.
- Sixth, I use a more demanding model, in which the interaction terms between province and cohort fixed effects are included, to address the unobservable province and cohort covarying characteristics. Results reported in Table SI-13 show that this model does not qualitatively change my results, although the estimate on *Intervention* becomes less precise because of a great number of new parameters added to the model.
- Seventh, I reanalyze data using imputed data for missing values. Table SI-14 and Figure SI-11 show that the results are very similar to the ones using listwise deletion in the main analysis.

Table SI-7: Different Bandwidths: This regression table shows the OLS estimates of the effects of the new politics textbooks using three different bandwidths. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province \times cohort level.

VARIABLES	Intervention			Democracy			Trust		
	One-Cohort (1)	Two-Cohort (2)	Three-Cohort (3)	One-Cohort (4)	Two-Cohort (5)	Three-Cohort (6)	One-Cohort (7)	Two-Cohort (8)	Three-Cohort (9)
New Curriculum	0.287* (0.158)	0.216 (0.135)	0.167* (0.099)	0.227 (0.237)	0.217 (0.232)	-0.162 (0.173)	-0.123 (0.350)	-0.262 (0.322)	-0.039 (0.276)
Affiliated Student	-0.447* (0.240)	-0.318* (0.169)	-0.285** (0.128)	-0.698** (0.330)	-0.173 (0.215)	-0.086 (0.219)	-1.316*** (0.417)	-0.358 (0.428)	-0.270 (0.309)
New Curriculum \times Affiliated Student	0.486* (0.280)	0.387* (0.223)	0.287 (0.184)	1.167*** (0.381)	0.733*** (0.256)	0.621** (0.241)	2.048*** (0.495)	0.939* (0.478)	0.990*** (0.352)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	788	1,108	1,595	209	296	431	103	138	206
R-squared	0.101	0.079	0.058	0.197	0.111	0.078	0.305	0.289	0.233

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table SI-8: Birth Months: This regression table shows the OLS estimates of the effects of the new textbooks, taking respondents' birth months into account when coding their treatment conditions. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province \times cohort level.

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democracy	(3) Trust
New Curriculum	-0.154*** (0.055)	-0.244 (0.150)	-0.194 (0.210)
Affiliated Student	-0.274*** (0.100)	-0.165 (0.160)	-0.097 (0.216)
New Curriculum \times Affiliated Students	0.388* (0.207)	0.726*** (0.211)	0.845*** (0.294)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,075	536	275
R-squared	0.049	0.064	0.198

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table SI-9: Matching Analysis: This regression table shows the main results using a reweighted sample that matches on parents' public employment status. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are in parentheses.

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democracy	(3) Trust
New Curriculum	0.113 (0.173)	-0.558 (0.343)	0.129 (0.279)
Affiliated Student	-0.282** (0.116)	-0.556*** (0.212)	-0.207 (0.229)
New Curriculum \times Affiliated Student	0.376** (0.176)	1.219*** (0.288)	0.642** (0.280)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,014	524	271
R-squared	0.128	0.225	0.344

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table SI-10: Inclusion of Individual Controls: This regression table reports the OLS estimates of the effect of the new textbooks with pretreatment and posttreatment individual-level controls. Standard errors are clustered at the province \times cohort level.

VARIABLES	Pre-Treatment			Pre- and Post-Treatment		
	Intervention	Democracy	Trust	Intervention	Democracy	Trust
New Curriculum	0.113 (0.088)	-0.217 (0.161)	-0.113 (0.235)	0.109 (0.087)	-0.260 (0.161)	-0.076 (0.240)
Affiliated Student	-0.190 (0.123)	-0.322 (0.195)	-0.183 (0.281)	-0.212* (0.123)	-0.367* (0.194)	-0.127 (0.287)
New Curriculum × Affiliated Student	0.299* (0.174)	0.891*** (0.211)	0.740** (0.343)	0.317* (0.174)	0.875*** (0.213)	0.690* (0.356)
Gender (Male=1)	-0.012 (0.078)	0.294** (0.121)	0.164 (0.246)	-0.010 (0.077)	0.309** (0.131)	0.102 (0.255)
Ethnicity (Han=1)	-0.032 (0.115)	-0.053 (0.182)	0.086 (0.253)	-0.005 (0.111)	-0.084 (0.183)	0.108 (0.263)
Height	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.014 (0.012)
Hukou (Rural=1)	0.017 (0.071)	-0.146* (0.087)	0.187 (0.168)	-0.022 (0.072)	-0.158* (0.088)	0.154 (0.168)
CCP Father	0.123* (0.066)	0.057 (0.127)	-0.127 (0.185)	0.165** (0.067)	0.069 (0.130)	-0.113 (0.216)
CCP Mother	-0.266*** (0.078)	-0.046 (0.353)	0.273 (0.253)	-0.199** (0.080)	0.102 (0.339)	0.270 (0.260)
Father's Education	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.038 (0.030)	0.029 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.012)	-0.044 (0.030)	0.037 (0.032)
Mother's Education	-0.029** (0.014)	0.032 (0.028)	0.000 (0.035)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.026 (0.028)	0.009 (0.034)
Edu. Attainment				0.001 (0.010)	0.041* (0.021)	-0.033 (0.029)
Internet Usage				-0.131*** (0.027)	-0.027 (0.050)	-0.093 (0.076)
Social Status				0.022 (0.016)	0.014 (0.040)	-0.029 (0.046)
CCP Membership				-0.171*** (0.060)	-0.093 (0.174)	-0.014 (0.311)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,010	523	271	1,995	518	270
R-squared	0.068	0.097	0.211	0.087	0.108	0.223

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table SI-11: Addressing Non-Randomized Reform: This regression table shows the OLS estimates of the effect of the new textbooks accounting for interaction terms between provincial gross regional product per capita in 2003 and the cohort fixed effects. The regressions coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province \times cohort level.

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democracy	(3) Trust
New Curriculum	0.058 (0.088)	-0.240 (0.172)	-0.020 (0.189)
Affiliated Student	-0.316*** (0.119)	-0.310* (0.187)	-0.088 (0.225)
New Curriculum \times Affiliated Student	0.292* (0.172)	0.768*** (0.210)	0.535** (0.256)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,075	536	275
R-squared	0.050	0.085	0.227

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table SI-12: Province-Specific, Cross Cohort Linear Trend: This regression table reports the OLS estimates of the effects of the new textbooks, accounting for (linear) trend across cohorts within a province. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province \times cohort level.

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democracy	(3) Trust
New Curriculum	0.070 (0.081)	-0.267 (0.163)	-0.035 (0.261)
Affiliated Student	-0.305** (0.120)	-0.273 (0.186)	-0.177 (0.291)
New Curriculum \times Affiliated Student	0.301* (0.172)	0.786*** (0.211)	0.701** (0.348)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Linear Trend	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,075	536	275
R-squared	0.062	0.124	0.242

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table SI-13: A Tighter Model Specification: This regression table presents the OLS estimates of the effects of new textbooks using a tighter model specification, in which a full set of interaction terms between province fixed effects and cohort fixed effects are included. The regression coefficients are standardized.

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democracy	(3) Trust
New Curriculum	-0.691 (0.639)	-0.927 (0.725)	-0.632 (0.595)
Affiliated Student	-0.317*** (0.117)	-0.408* (0.245)	-0.171 (0.407)
New Curriculum × Affiliated Student	0.205 (0.169)	0.943*** (0.307)	1.001** (0.484)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Province FE x Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,075	536	275
R-squared	0.123	0.284	0.456

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table SI-14: Multiple Imputation: This regression table reports the OLS estimates of the effects of the new textbooks based on ten multiple-imputed datasets. The missing values are imputed by *Amelia* in R. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province × cohort level.

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democracy	(3) Trust
New Curriculum	0.079 (0.085)	-0.234 (0.195)	-0.013 (0.233)
Affiliated Student	-0.303** (0.118)	-0.352 (0.219)	-0.185 (0.256)
New Curriculum × Affiliated Student	0.288* (0.170)	0.922*** (0.282)	0.724** (0.295)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,092	588	280

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table SI-15: Parental Indoctrination: This regression table shows the mean differences in the targeted attitudes between affiliated and nonaffiliated respondents who did not attend high school during the reform period. Results are based on a five-cohort bandwidth on each side of the curriculum. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province \times cohort level.

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democracy	(3) Trust
Affiliated Respondents (0 versus 1)	0.014 (0.289)	-0.292 (0.471)	-0.034 (0.607)
Constant	-0.108 (0.089)	-0.088 (0.137)	-0.172 (0.610)
Province FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,106	268	114
R-squared	0.096	0.157	0.278

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Figure SI-5: Bandwidth Selections: This coefficient plot shows the marginal effects of the new textbooks using different bandwidths (+/-1, +/-2, and +/-3). The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals.




Figure SI-6: Information on Birth Month: This coefficient plot presents the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks, taking respondents' birth months into account when coding their treatment conditions. The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals.




Figure SI-7: Matching Analysis: This coefficient plot shows the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks using a reweighted sample generated by the entropy balancing method. The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals.




Figure SI-8: Inclusion of Individual Controls: This coefficient plot presents the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks, controlling for a battery of personal characteristics. The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals.




Figure SI-9: Addressing Non-Randomized Reform: This coefficient plot shows the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks, controlling for interaction terms between provincial GRP Per Capital and cohort fixed effects. The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 90% confidence intervals.




Figure SI-10: Province-Specific, Cross-Cohort Trends: This coefficient plot presents the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks, allowing each province to have its own linear trend in attitudes across cohorts. The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals.





Figure SI-11: Imputed Data for Missing Values: This coefficient plot shows the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks. The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals. The regression estimates are based on 10 multiple-imputed datasets to cope with missing values.



References

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